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The court distinguished the case sub 
judice from Jensen, supra. Jensen involved 
the loss of control of an automobile al-
legedly due to a defect in the steering 
mechanism where the only evidence pro-
duced was the plaintiffs' testimony that 
he heard the tires squeal. The court stated 
that the plaintiffs in Jensen failed to ne-
gate other causes of the accident. 
In the area of products liability, involv-
ing the theories of strict liability and im-
plied warranty of merchantibility, the 
holding in this case has the potential to 
provide a "windfall" to plaintiffs. The 
practical effect of the decision will be to 
shift the essential burden of proof to the 
defendant. As it stands now, the plaintiff 
is required to testify that he bought the 
product and that he did not misuse or 
alter the product, thus, effectively shift-
ing to the defendant the burden of prov-
ing that the causal effect of the accident 
was not produced by the defendant. 
The decision has further eroded the rule 
of caveat emptor. With regard to strict 
liability, it now appears that in order to 
reach the jury, who most often will side 
with the injured plaintiff, evidence of an 
accident which injured the plaintiff is 
needed; coupled with the plaintiff's heart-
felt assurances that he did not misuse, 
alter or even touch the product (i.e., "all 
of a sudden, it just blew up") will be suffi-
cient proof. This case takes the position 
that a plaintiff's testimony will not be 
self-serving. It may be too much to ask of 
an injured party. 
- Kevin L. Beard 
New Hampshire v. Piper: OPENS 
DOORS TO BAR ADMISSION 
In Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. 
Piper, 105 S.Ct. 1272 (1985), the United 
States Supreme Court held that New 
Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 42, 
which limits bar admission to state resi-
dents, violated the privileges and immuni-
ties clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, article IV, section 2, clause 1. By this 
ruling, the Court has affected the residency 
requirements for lawyers in at least twenty-
seven states. Low, Lawyer Residency Re-
quirement Axed by Supreme Court, The 
Daily Record, Mar. 12, 1985 at 4, col. 3. 
However, Maryland is not one of the states 
affected by this ruling. See, e.g., Rule 10 of 
Rules Governing Admission to the Bar of 
Maryland (deleted Jan. 22, 1982). 
In Piper, the appellee, Kathryn Piper, a 
resident of a town in Vermont, which was 
located about 400 yards from the New 
Hampshire border, passed the New Hamp-
shire bar examination in 1980. She was in-
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formed by the New Hampshire Board of 
Bar Examiners, however, that before she 
could practice law in the state of New 
Hampshire she would have to become a 
resident of New Hampshire pursuant to 
New Hampshire Supreme Court Rule 42. 
Appellee requested from the Clerk of the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court a dispen-
sation from the residency requirement, ex-
plaining that her personal situation ne-
gated the convenience of becoming a New 
Hampshire resident. The Clerk denied 
appellee's request. Piper than petitioned 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court for 
permission to become a member of the 
bar. The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
denied her request. The appellee filed the 
present action in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Hamp-
shire. The court ruled in 1982 that the 
New Hampshire residency requirement 
violated the privileges and immunities 
clause. New Hampshire v. Piper, 539 F. 
Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982). The Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the 
ruling. New Hampshire v. Piper, 723 F.2d 
110 (1st Cir. 1983). 
The Court in Piper begins by discussing 
the intent of the privileges and immunities 
clause. The clause, according to the Court, 
was intended to "fuse into one Nation 
a collection of independent, sovereign 
States." Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 
395 (1948). Consequently, it is "[0 Jnly with 
respect to those 'privileges' and 'immuni-
ties' bearing on the vitality of the nation as 
a single entity that a State must accord resi-
dents and nonresidents equal treatment." 
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 
436 U.S. 371,383 (1978). Therefore, the 
privileges and immunities clause only pro-
tects fundamental rights. 
The Court determined that practicing 
law is a fundamental right protected by 
that clause. First, one of the purposes of 
the clause is "to create a national economic 
union." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1276. Since 
"the practice oflaw is important to the na-
tional economy," it is a fundamental right 
which is protected. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 
1277. Second, the practice oflaw is a fun-
damental right because in cases where "un-
popular federal claims" are raised "repre-
sentation by nonresident counsel may be 
the only means available for the vindica-
tion offederal rights." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 
1277. 
In addition, the Court noted that the 
practice oflaw does not involve an exercise 
of state power as in In re Gnffiths, 413 
U.S. 717 (1973), justifying a residency 
requirement. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1278. In-
stead, a lawyer is a private businessman 
and not "an 'officer' of the State in any po-
litical sense." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1278. 
Although the Court determined that 
practicing law is a fundamental right, the 
state can still discriminate against non-
residents where: "(i) there is a substantial 
reason for the difference in treatment; and 
(ii) the discrimination practiced against 
nonresidents bears a substantial relation-
ship to the State's objective." Piper, 105 
S.Ct. at 1279. The Court determined, how-
ever, that New Hampshire did not show 
substantial reasons that were substantially 
related to the state's objective to discrim-
inate against nonresident attorneys. First, 
"[tJhere is no evidence to support the State's 
claim that nonresidents might be less likely 
to keep abreast of local rules and proce-
dures." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1279. Second, 
"there is no reason to believe that a non-
resident lawyer will conduct his practice 
in a dishonest manner. The nonresident 
lawyer's professional duty and interest in 
his reputation should provide the same in-
centive to maintain high ethical standards 
as they do for resident lawyers." Piper, 105 
S.Ct. at 1279. Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire "has the author-
ity to discipline all members of the bar, re-
gardless of where they reside." Piper, 105 
S.Ct. at 1279. Third, the argument that a 
nonresident attorney will not be available 
for court proceedings is unsound because 
in those cases where the nonresident 
counsel will be unavailable on short 
notice, the State can protect its inter-
ests through less restrictive means. The 
trial court, by rule or as an exercise of 
discretion, may require any lawyer who 
resides at a great distance to retain a 
local attorney who will be available for 
unscheduled meetings and hearings. 
Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1280. 
Fourth, the contention that nonresident 
lawyers will not "do their share of pro bono 
and volunteer work" is not necessarily 
true. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1280. A nonresi-
dent lawyer could be "required to repre-
sent indigents and perhaps to participate 
in formal legal-aid work." Piper, 105 S.Ct. 
at 1280. 
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Piper, ar-
guing that there are substantial reasons 
why a state would discriminate against 
nonresident lawyers. First, 
the State has a substantial interest in 
creating its own set oflaws responsive 
to its own local interests, and it is rea-
sonable for a State to decide that those 
people who have been trained to ana-
lyze law and policy are better equipped 
to write those state laws and adjudicate 
cases arising under them. The State 
therefore may decide that it has an in-
terest in maximizing the number of 
resident lawyers, so as to increase the 
quality of the pool from which its law-
makers can be drawn. 
Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1283. 
Second, since lawyers play an important 
role in the formation of state policy, "they 
should be intimately conversant with the 
local concerns that should inform such 
policies." Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 1283. Third, 
the state may have an interest in having 
resident attorneys "bring their useful ex-
pertise to other important functions that 
benefit from such expertise and are of in-
terest to state governments-such as trust-
eeships, or directorships of corporations or 
charitable organizations, or school board 
positions, or merely the role of the inter-
ested citizen at a town meeting." Piper, 
105 S.Ct. at 1283. Fourth, a state does 
have a substantial interest in assuring that 
there not be a delay in litigation due to 
nonresident lawyers. Piper, 105 S.Ct. at 
1285. 
The Court in Piper has promulgated a 
rule which will cause the amendment of, if 
not the abolition of, residency require-
ments for lawyers in at least twenty-seven 
states. The fears of Justice Rehnquist, 
however, do not seem to be sound. Non-
resident lawyers have represented clients, 
with the permission of the courts, on a pro 
hac vice basis for years. By allowing attor-
neys to practice on a regional or national 
level, this ruling will permit the public to 
have a freer hand in selecting competent 
legal counsel. 
-Sam Piazza 
California v. Carney: A MAN'S 
MOBILE HOME IS NOT 
HIS CASTLE 
In Calzjornia v. Carney, 105 S.Ct. 2066 
(1985), the Supreme Court of the United 
States held that federal narcotics agents 
did not violate the fourth amendment 
when they conducted a warrantless search 
based on probable cause of a mobile home 
parked in a public parking lot. In so doing, 
the Court, for the first time applied the 
"automobile exception" to a fully mobile 
motor home. 
Federal narcotics agents had reason to 
believe that Carney was exchanging mari-
juana for sex in a motor home parked in a 
lot in downtown San Diego. The defendant 
was observed downtown as he approached 
a youth and accompanied him back to the 
motor home. When the youth emerged he 
was stopped by the agents who then learned 
that he had received marijuana in return 
for allowing Carney sexual contacts. The 
officers persuaded the youth to return to 
the motor home and knock on the door. 
When Carney stepped out the agents iden-
tified themselves and without a warrant or 
consent, one agent entered and observed 
marijuana and drug paraphernalia. A sub-
sequent search of the motor home at the 
police station revealed additional mari-
juana. 
After unsuccessful attempts to have the 
evidence discovered in the motor home 
suppressed, the defendant pleaded nolo 
contendre to possession of marijuana for 
sale. The California Court of Appeal af-
firmed (People v. Carney, 117 Cal. App. 
3d 36, 172 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1981)), but the 
California Supreme Court reversed People 
v. Carney, 34 Cal. 3d 597,194 Cal. Rptr. 
500, 668 P.2d 807 (1983), holding the 
"automobile exception" inapplicable to a 
motor home. 
Chief Justice Burger, author of the 
Court's opinion, began by reviewing the 
"automobile exception" to the general rule 
that a warrant must be secured before a 
search is undertaken. Carney, 105 S.Ct. 
at 2068. This exception to the warrant re-
quirement had its genesis in Carroll v. 
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The 
Court justified the lesser degree of protec-
tion of privacy interests in an automobile 
by relying principally on the ready mo-
bility of the automobile. 
"However, although ready mobility 
alone was perhaps the original justification 
for the vehicle exception, our later cases 
have made clear that ready mobility is not 
the only basis for the exception." Carney, 
105 S.Ct. at 2069. Because one has a lesser 
expectation of privacy in one's automobile 
than one's home, the warrant requirement 
is relaxed notwithstanding the mobility of 
the vehicle. Cady v. Dombrowskl~ 413 U.S. 
433 (1973). "These reduced expectations 
of privacy derive not from the fact that the 
area to be searched is in plain view, but 
from the pervasive regulation of vehicles 
capable of traveling on the public high-
ways." Carney, 105 S.Ct. at 2069. 
The Court was now forced to charac-
terize the motor home as either an auto-
mobile or a home. "While it is true that the 
[defendant's] vehicle possessed some, if 
not many of the attributes of a home, it is 
equally clear that the vehicle falls clearly 
within the exception laid down in Car-
roll . .. " Carney, 105 S.Ct. at 2070. The 
Chief Justice noted that the motor home 
was readily mobile and subject to exten-
sive regulation-the two justifications un-
derlying the "automobile exception." 
However, the Chief Justice made a third 
observation; "the vehicle was so situated 
that an objective observer would conclude 
that it was being used not as a residence, 
but as a vehicle." Id. at 2070. This may 
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